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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by the bank to recover from the surety
c·•rnpany certain sums which the bank paid to laborers and
"aterialmen who were named beneficiaries under the surety's
;;ayncent bond.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Up0n motion of the defendant, the Fourth Judicial District
rnurt, the Honorable David Sam presiding, awarded summary judgment
:sr the defendant, no cause of action.
~'__.1'rna

A copy of the Order of

Judgment is attached hereto as Appendix A.

ry

RELIFF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
i·ht:'

['
I

·

~

laintitt-appellant seeks to have the judgment of the
,-

I!

rt

t r_'\IPrSPi..J,

and to have the cause remanded for a trial

r I t S ,

STATFMFNT OF FACTS
<·n •·r

3~.,,ut

f'e>hruary 17, 1981, the defendant executed a

"Subcontract Labor and Material Payment Bond",
which is attached hereto as Appendix 8.
on the bond, Valley Builders, was tr1c'

( p.

[tlll"'

a rPduc,·<I L·.i /

: )

ThP

narrit_·0

'""trdct<r •n

contract for the construction of a school huil<linij.
Company,

the principal on the bond, was a subcontractor

em~ lc .

1

Valley Builders to do the masonry work.
To provide financing for the completion of the project,
Masonry sought financing from the plaintiff bank,

AT~

and the bank

extended a line of credit to ATM in the amount of $50,000.00.

15)

1;

As security for the line of credit, ATM assigned to the banr

ATM's right to receive payments from Valley Builders.
the assignment was given to Valley Builders,

Not ice 0t

but Valley BuilOers

failed to comply with the assignment and made some payments
directly to ATM and to laborers and materialmen.

(R.

16,

341

Pursuant to the terms of the contract between ATM and the
bank, payments were made to laborers and materialmen to the exte1'"
of the line of credit.

( R.

6)

Because Valley Builders failed

t.

honor the assignment of the contract proceeds to the bank, the ca:·
was not reimbursed for the payments made to laborers and materia.men.

( R.

34)

The bank then brought this action to recover, trrc

the surety company,
and materialmen.

the $50,000.00 which had been paid to labore'.·

( R.

6)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE BANK IS EQUITABLY ENTITLED TO BE SllBROc;i\Hi'
TO THE RIGHTS OF LABORERS AND MATER I ALMEN, WHtlM
IT PAID; CASES TO THE CONTRARY SHOULD BE <WfPRl,U.I
Subrogation was developed by the courts of equity t1) Pnal·l·

-2-

,,,rp

LJ

~IL~

1

;

r

0

1

t l X

rul~s

of law, and to allow the equity court

ndturill Justice of placing the burden where it ought

th~

'c.!
· ' 01r

t_ f. f,

1'1

,._,cit u-,11

11_.st 1 1:µ

is [ l 1able and carable of being molded to

t<.· ccr"[.el the ultimate discharge of a debt or obliga-

f"I tbe party who in good conscience ought to pay it.

t111n

t<]lsta_te_ Insurance_ Co_. __v_._1-'-'_i_e, 606 P.2d 1197, 1202 (Utah 1980).
The equities of the instant situation are readily apparent.
rte entity primarily responsible for paying the laborers and
~aterialmen

was ATM Masonry.

ATM Masonry, in turn, was to receive

those funds from Valley Builders.

To bridge the time gap, however,

tetween the receipt of funds from Valley Builders and the required
;oyments for materials and labor, ATM sought a line of credit from
the hank.

The bank, for compensation, agreed to provide the line

credit to the extent of 550,000.00 and as security took an

cf

assignment of the contract payments from Valley Builders.

therefore, undertook to provide the liquidity necessary to

~ank,

e~able

ATM Masonry to pay its debts and perform its contract prior

'.·)receiving the contract payments from Valley Builders.
~:0

The

The bank

net, however, undertake to guarantee that the laborers or

•atErialmen would actually be paid, or to guarantee that the contract would be completed.
The surety company, on the other hand, did undertake, for
",ersation, to assume the risk that the laborers and materialmen
It is clear that, had the bank not been present
1 ;nodct

i n.J,

.rsuilnt to

ion,

the lal>orers and materialmen would not have

ilnt1 the surety would have been required to make payment
th~

terms of the payment bond.
-3-

With the bank in the

transaction, the bank advanced funds for payments tu the'

J

,,tir,rc:

and materialmen, and was to have been reimbursed pro tant•, i"J'
suant to the terms of the ass1gnmc'tlt,

fr<lm V21ll•'Y k111l<lerc

Valley Builders complied with the assignment,

the bank would

been repaid in full for the line of credit thus extended.

Any

laborers and materialmen not paid would have had a claim against
the bond.
The role of the bank, therefore, and the purpose for which
was compensated, was to provide liquidity.

1•

The role of the suret

on the other hand, and the purpose for which it was compensated,
was to insure against the risk of default on the part of ATM Mass"
The holding of the trial court, however, would require the bank•·
assume both roles.

Valley Builders did not comply with the terns

of the assignment of contract proceeds, and instead paid some fer:
directly to ATM Masonry.

ATM Masonry breached the terms of its

contract and failed to use those funds to pay laborers and matena
men.

This was exactly the type of risk against which the suret;

had agreed to insure, and the surety would normally have been
required to provide payment for those unpaid laborers and matena.·
men.

However,

because of the mistaken belief that Valley Builde:'

would honor the assignment,

the bank,

through ATM, mistakenly

~a:.

those laborers and materialmen, but did not receive the anticira·
contract proceeds in reimbursement.

To require the bank tn tru·

bear the burden of ATM's default would be manifestly lnt>•Jt ''
and contrary to the clear intent of the surety agreement
In Paxton v. Spencer, this Court stated as follows:

-4-

Tn hold the surety liable for advancements
made or money loaned to the contractors to
enable them to carry out the contract without
the assent of a surety, unless the facts are
suer that it would be inequitable to not hold
the surety liable, is to read into the contract a liability not assumed by the surety
and a liability clearly not contemplated by
the parties at the date of the execution of
the bond,
-1 Utah 313,

265 P. 751, 753 (1928)

(emphasis added).

This case comes within the above stated exception to the
oaxton rule.

The surety, and not the bank, agreed in consideration

of premiums paid to insure against cost overruns and unpaid materialmen on the project.

Had the bank not extended credit, no pay-

mPnts would have been made,

and the surety would obviously have

been required to honor its obligation on the bond,

It would be

manifestly inequitable to absolve the surety company of its contractual obligation solely because the payments must now flow to a
third party beneficiary, rather than directly to the materialmen
r_ 1

r the na!1'ed obligee.
The appellant acknowledges that there is a large body of law

which holds that the bank's claim for money loaned to a contractor
and used to pay for labor and materials is not within the coverage
0f a bond which guarantees payment for that labor and materials.
Annot,, Money loaned or advanced to contractor as within coverage
0

f

0ond of building or construction contractor, 127 A.L.R. 974
However,
,1nal
,,JI
Th~

that rule,

though old,

is not sound or equitable.

hasis for the rule no longer exists and the rule now

as an anomaly in equity jurisprudence.

early cases labeled banks as volunteers, and having so

-5-

labeled them, denied them any recovery against the hond.

The

courts apparently viewed banks as having no obligation, contractual, legal, moral, or otherwise, to pay the laborers and
materialmen, and the courts therefore held that ariy [Jaym"'nt,
by the banks were essentially gifts.

see

12~

A.L.R. 989.

The volunteer rule has been soundly criticized in G. Osboro,
G. Nelson, and D. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law 605 (19791:
The limits as well as the rationale of
the volunteer rule are a matter of dispute.
It has been asserted that, whenever courts
for any reason deny subrogation, they
characterize the unsuccessful applicant as a
volunteer.
Even when used with more discrimination it has sometimes been unclear whether
subrogation was denied because the court
found that the plaintiff did not intend any
legal consequences to flow from his act,
e.g., he intended a gift, or that his intervention was unsolicited and therefore officious.
A critical examination of the reasons offered
for using the rule to deny subrogation on
payment of a creditor by a third person has
revealed them to be so lacking in force as to
make reasonable the suggestion that, in order
for such a payment to be officious, it must
be unnecessary and confer no benefit.
Because of the variety and unpredictability
of its application, the voluntary payment
test is of little value.
Except in cases in
which the payer clearly intended a gift, it
should be discarded.
(Footnotes omitted.)

see also Hult v. Ebinger, 222 Or. 169, 352

P.2d 583, 592 (1960)

("It is obvious that the modern practice '-'r.:

permits free alienability of choses has robbed the 'volunteer' r
of much of its rational justification.").
Even if some aspects of the volunteer rule remain in efff
it is difficult to see how the rule can
instant case.

e~uitably

he

Although the bank was not coerced to

aµ~l••''
prov1d~

of credit to the subcontractor, the bank's payments to the la~cr

-6-

fl'ater1almen were l>y no means voluntary within any commonly

,n,1

.r.,~erstood

r

t

2fi5 P.

113,

tJr'

r1c

1 J,J

meaning cif that weird.

\lr~1

751

119281,

unteer rule.

a road,

The case of Paxton v, Spencer, 71

presents a more reasonable application

In that case, Paxton had contracted to

and had subcontracted a portion of the work to

Spencer became financially distressed, and so Paxton then
cttained a loan for the benefit of Spencer.
his contract and on the loan,

bonding company.
affirmed,
~atter.

Spencer defaulted on

and Paxton sought recovery from the

The trial court denied recovery, and this Court

The case is wholly distinguishable from the instant
Paxton's loan of money to Spencer was not pursuant to any

contractual obligation, but was truly voluntary.

In contrast, the

hank in this case had a contractual obligation to pay the laborers
and materialmen, and the payments cannot be considered voluntary.
A Utah case more analogous to the facts here is State Division
of Family Services v.

Clark, 554 P.2d 1310 (Utah 1976).

The State

had made payments to support children, and sought reimbursement
from the fathers on a theory of subrogation.
contractual obligations in the instant matter,

Similar to the bank's
the State had volun-

tarily entered into a statutory obligation to provide support for
the children.

The court held that the State was entitled to re-

cover the payments from the fathers.
To the extent that Paxton v. Spencer, supra, and other similar

·aces hold that a person who loans money to a subcontractor is a
I ''''~er

and therefore is not entitled to subrogation,
U\'f?rculed.

-7-

those cases

POINT I I
A MATERIAL ISSLIE OF FAl'T C:XISTS /1,S
THE PAYMENTS hFRE vr 'I l'NT,\PY.
The

law concern in(_;

whl'tf·~'r

in 7 3 Am • Ju r . 2 d Sub r og at inn

~

,--i

i

~/ll'l rit

r(I
•,I

\•llr'THI-,);

1r1 1 , i

r 1

l :...,

:,

f"

1

24 ( l 974 I

Generally speaking, the party making
payment is a volunteer if, in so doing, he
has no right or interest of his own to protect, and acts without obligation, moral or
legal, and without being requested by anyone
liable on the obligation. A volunteer may be,
but is not necessarily, one who has nothing
to do with the transaction out of which the
debt grew.

One is not a volunteer within the rule
here considered where he pays the debt at the
instance, solicitation, or request of the
person whose liability he discharges, or of
that person's agent or representative.
And
one is not a volunteer, so as to be denied
subrogation, who advances money to another
for the payment of claims with an express or
implied agreement of either the debtor or the
creditor that he shall acquire the rights
which the person paid had under a bond or
other contract; and this is so even though
the surety or secondary obligor made no
request of him or had no notice of his
advancing the money.
(Emphasis added,

footnotes omitted)

Surety Co. v. Meyer,

See also Western Casualt\ '

301 Ky. 487, 192 S.W.2d 388, 164 A.L.R. c

( 194 6) •
In the instant case,

the bank certainly did not "voluntari-

hand out money to the laborers and materialmen.

The bank h, ,,

checks to the laborers and materialmen at the specif11· r"' '"
and pursuant to a contractual obligation with, ATM Masunt
discharging ATM's obligation to the laborers and

materialm~n.

bank thus comes squarely within the scope of the abnve s1e•en

-8-

, i was

th L' r c· t () r f!

n( t

3

l untcoer.

POINT I I I
I

fHf HANK IS A THIPD-PAPTY BENEFICIARY OF THE
r1NTRAC1 .

A person

is a third party beneficiary of a contract if

of the contract will satisfy a duty of the promisee to

:~rtormance

Ke 11 y v • Rich a rd s , 9 5 Utah 5 6 0 , 8 3 p . 2 d 7 31 , 7 3 5

henef ic iary.

1C.e

il ~ J 8) •

In determining whether a contract was intended to benefit

'hP third person,

the court may look at the terms of the agreement

and at the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the
Mel Trimble Real Estate v.

e11reement.
r1 1tah

1981)

Fitzgerald,

626 P.2d 453

In reviewing the terms of the agreement and in look-

1ng at the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreecent, all doubt should be resolved in favor of allowing recovery
'ender the bond, as a contract of a surety,

Ccnesco Industries
'.2d 312,

317

77 Utah 226, 293 P. 611,

, Ltd. v.

is strictly

J. F. Talton Investment Co. v.

c0nstrued against the surety.
''aryland Casualty Co.,

for hire,

612 ( 1930);

Conforti and Eisele,

Inc.,

D.C., 627

(O.C. Cir. 1980).

The surety company in the instant matter undertook,
,ensation,

to insure against the risk of default on the part of ATM
Specifically,

1

for com-

the surety undertook to insure against loss

r·rsnns as a result of the failure of ATM Masonry to pay labor,,i

m,:i.tE-'r1almen.

ua•ie

1•, 1

•
:~,·t

t

The surety seeks to avoid liability by hiding

in the bond to the effect that the surety is obli-

claimants,

and claimants are limited to those having

C<'ntracts with ATM Masonry for labor or materials.

-9-

The bank

admittedly does not have a direct contract ·..ii th A.T'1 "·"'·'
obligates the bank

itself to pnwi<lP L1'•

bank's claim nonetheless cn11ie.·s w1th1n
intented to be covered by the bond,

t

,.,

111,·it· r·l.,] : .

ti.•·

anll

rir'i

t

~

It

the Lank must

l

t-;e

,,

n,
I

1

l

[T

,:Je•·rcc.

be a third-party beneficiary of the bond.
A contrary holding would render the bond meaningless.

Tho

bond provides that "the Condition of this Obligation is such t'':
if the Principal shall promptly make payment to all claimants as
hereinafter defined,

for all labor and material used or reasona:.

required for use in the performance of a subcontract,

then this

obligation shall be void; otherwise it shall remain in full for
and effect

The principal did not promptly make payrr·e··

to all claimants, and the bond is therefore in full
effect,

but for what purpose?

the surety,

force anc

Under the construction advocats: •

the bond no longer has any effect, even though the

principal did not make prompt payment to all claimants.
bond is to have full force and effect,

If the

as required by its terms,

the bond must be used to satisfy the claims resulting from ATM's
default.

To the extent that the provision that the bond remain

full force and effect conflicts with the provision limitinlj "de:
ants"

to only those having direct contracts with the contract·

the conflict should be resolved strictly against the surety.
CONCLUSION
The bank cannot be considered to have "vnluntar1l,
money to the laborers and materialmen.

The bank,

l·y 11• n. ·t

checks written against the line of credit,

paid the l;it.orc>to

materialmen at the request of ATM Masonry,

and pursuant

-10-

tc• c•

c

t,

i,-

r L..oa

r

ri'

\'r'

1-_:iatl 1 -)n:

1u

t-

ir"

;1:id

~.as

1

r:

1 ( ,:-, l

r1

r

fr,r

the payments were there-

Ti; the extent that Utah cases hold that such

tar'/.

·-· 1 luntar'.;,

is

nicer existing law,

thnse cases should be overruled.

The

ttw vnlunteer rule has long since vanished, and

rule has no current Justification.

• 0~

Jn addition,
•en0fici~ry

the bank must be considered to be a third party

of the surety contract, and thus entitled to recover.

The decision of the trial court granting summary judgment for
:he defendant should be reversed,

and the caused remanded for a

trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of Augu;t,
/

1983.
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r.

600 Com-

this 1st day of

:,.

>~I

CITY

L~kt:_

\JT<H

IN THI: fSUFTH JUDICU.L DISTFICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

-----------------------------0000000----------------------------Vl!1S,C,TCH BA:-Jt: OF
PLE1\Si\!'lT GRO'!E,
c1 cur1-iuratic,:-i,
Plaintiff,

ORDER OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VS.

SU'· ;::TY PJ S URAclCE COMP A.NY
OF CALIFORNIA, a corporation,

Civil No.

62 ,023

Defendant.

-----------------------------0000000----------------------------The Motion cf defendant, Surety Insurance Company of Calif~rnia,

1183,

.s

having cone on for hearing pursuant to notice on March 25,
with Stephen F.

P ·x Lewis,

Hutchinson, counsel for defendant, and

cc,unsel for plaintiff, present,

t

nu mater13l

1::s':->

therei: r,

and it appearing

facts are in dispute, and that there is good

now,

therefore,

-1-

APPENDIX A

·-it'~

,1:..·l

1

~>)llein

for

:-::;umrnary Judgment for no cause

on sr. _,u.ld hr:: and the same is h"='reby granted, with

~a.::h

to bc3r its own costs.
lJc.'~Lc.J this ~day of April,
BY

1983.

THE COURT:

fl.~
!~~ )
DIST~COUR'T.°"J""u'°oo-G""E~-----

DAVID

SAM,

-

2 -

I-'

,.

-•r•

'!

I ..

.'

~)

', '. '

t :•

'. l
' ( . 1'

'-

,,,..

" ' ·- (

Ih c

~,

'.,

\.', 1 1 'I

~ ·"

'• ._: ~~•r:r..i 1 :y, f•r :•',

~I

J ·

J/'·· 1

t,,,.J

•

, • -

•

I·~

,

l~

J1.l'_J

1,

t ~

··q·f Pr1>1c1,,

1

A'

I

.'.'_),I

i

IJ:,_·

t:1tm.ll,.c~, thr:1r f·::•;b,

~h ;.-:coCill~

,r,Lijul tu; by ..,r;l
:·Cn•t.:l•t C..itn.!
Octvt..:-• 11, 1S3J
r,tn:l w;~!i o·-_Jr.;,-":" (oJr l:Lt~r<
of the extE:;·io:c \.13-lls b":::ir..; put in
1<- _,.... - a_v;J:coxir·'.:·~lJ c·i :<":. (8) feet 'h1c:;h of 2-?p:-OA.r::·,tel; ,i:i.5~ of tte
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